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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses two fundamental methodological differences between feminist economics and neoclassical welfare economics. 
First, the notion of preference change is central to feminist economics, but on the margins of neoclassical welfare economics. Second, 
the identification of choice with well-being, which is the basis for much of neoclassical welfare analysis is deeply problematic for 
many feminists. Finally, the paper discusses ways in which feminist economists can go about evaluating economic policies. 
RESUME 
Cet article discute de deux differences de methodologie fondamentales entre I'economie feministe et I'economie neoclassique du bien-
etre social. Premierement la notion de preference de changement est centrale a I'economie feministe, mais en marge de I'economie 
neoclassique du bien-etre social. Deuxiemement, 1'identification de choix avec le bien-etre, ce qui est la base d'une grande partie de 
I'analyse neoclassique du bien-etre social, est extremement problematique pour un grand nombre de feministes. Finalement l'article 
discute des moyens par lesquels les economistes feministes peuvent s'y prendre pour evaluer les politiques economiques. 
Welfare economics is the framework 
within which the normative significance of 
economic events is evaluated. 
(Boadway and Bruce 1984, 1) 
The proper aim of feminism should be to 
establish a society in which there is sexual 
justice. (Richards 1980, 26) 
Feminists and neoclassical welfare 
economists share a concern for the evaluation of 
policy. However, a feminist welfare economics is 
just beginning to emerge. There are a number of 
economists who have used standard economic 
methodology to argue for policies to improve the 
status of women. The cogent arguments put forward 
by these committed feminist researchers have done 
much to improve the quality, quantity and focus of 
the policy debate on issues such as discrimination 
and employment equity, both inside and outside the 
economics profession. However, as I have argued 
elsewhere (Woolley 1993), research informed by 
rigorous empiricism, but from the vantage point that 
women matter, raises questions which 
fundamentally challenge neoclassical economic 
assumptions. Feminists dissatisfied with 
neoclassical economic methodology are beginning 
to develop alternative analytic frameworks, and 
these alternative approaches raise fundamental 
methodological questions about policy evaluation. 
It might be thought that a feminist welfare 
economics would simply be concerned with the 
effect of economic policy on women's welfare, or 
with the design of economic policies that are 
"good" for women. Yet feminism is not simply 
about improving the position of women; it is about 
understanding gender relations and promoting 
equity between men and women. Moreover, such a 
conception of feminist welfare economics begs the 
question of what "good for women" or "women's 
welfare" means. 
In neoclassical welfare economics, 
individual welfare is equated with individual utility, 
or satisfaction of individual preferences or wants. 
People's preferences are inferred from their choices, 
for example, the quantity of different goods 
demanded, contingent upon prices and incomes. 
This theory of welfare is used to develop principles 
of cost-benefit analysis and project evaluation, such 
as the principle that in the absence of market 
distortions costs and benefits should be evaluated at 
market prices, and a small project increases welfare 
if national income or GDP (at the original prices) 
increases. 
This paper sets out a number of feminist 
methodological challenges to this framework. First, 
I argue that, because "preferences" are one way that 
gender inequalities are generated and perpetuated 
and, because preferences are socially constructed, 
the changeability of preferences is a vital part of the 
feminist project of social change. This calls into 
question the neoclassical assumption that individual 
utility functions are exogenous and brings under 
scrutiny the institutions and social structures that 
shape preferences. Second, I join other feminist 
economists in questioning the meaning attached to 
utility in neoclassical economics. Is the utility 
function a description of people's preferences? The 
determinant of their choices? A measure of well-
being? Can it be all of these at the same time? The 
first two sections of this paper take up these two 
challenges, but conclude that building a foundation 
for policy evaluation using ideas of preference 
endogeneity and change is deeply problematic. The 
third section discusses two routes for breaking away 
from preference and welfare: treating "gender 
ideology," by which I mean a set of ideas about 
gender roles, as a constraint embodied in 
institutions, and moving to "capabilities" as a basis 
for social evaluation. 
I. THE ORIGINS AND CHANGEABILITY 
OF PREFERENCES 
Feminist economists have criticized 
neoclassical economics for so strongly emphasizing 
rational individual choice, while not inquiring into 
the origins of preferences ortheir changeability. For 
many neoclassical economists, a person's 
preferences are fixed and given: 
... one does not argue over tastes for the 
same reason that one does not argue over 
the Rocky Mountains - both are there, will 
be there next year, too, and are the same to 
all men. (Stigler and Becker 1977, 76) 
Moreover, because preferences are unknowable, 
explanations based on group differences or changes 
in preferences are empirically untestable ad hocery 
and, what's more, uninteresting. 
Neoclassical economists also avoid 
passing judgment on people's preferences. 
Ranking, for example, a preference for equity over 
a preference for efficiency would be making a 
value judgment. And, as every undergraduate 
economics major learns, when value judgments are 
involved, economics cannot tell us what the best 
policy is. 
To the extent that neoclassical economics 
has an ideology, it is the ideology of the status quo. 
Since preferences are unknowable, interpersonal 
comparisons are impossible. Neoclassical 
economists avoid interpersonal comparisons 
between gainers and losers by advocating policies 
which make everyone better off, the "Pareto 
criterion." The idea that a deviation from the status 
quo is only acceptable if it makes everybody better 
off leads to conservative policy-making, since 
almost no policy change will produce universal 
gains. 
The neoclassical approach is 
unsatisfactory for feminist analysis. Feminist 
economists have shown that attitudes and 
ideologies are part of the reason for women's 
inferior economic position. For example, sex-role 
ideologies and differences in women's and men's 
tolerance for mess are two reasons for the unequal 
division of household work. Socially constructed 
preferences are a reason for the undervaluation of 
women's caring labour. 
Feminism substitutes an ideology of 
change for the neoclassical ideology of the status 
quo. The key to feminism is not merely recognizing 
that attitudes and ideologies shape women's 
economic position; it is taking a stand that attitudes 
can and should be changed. "Feminism is a politics. 
It is a politics directed at changing existing power 
relations between men and women in society" 
(Weedon 1987,1). This belief in the possibility and 
desirability of improving women's position entails 
a belief in the possibility and desirability of 
changing preferences. 
Feminist economic thought on the origins 
of preferences has been influenced by a number of 
key works, many of them originating in other 
disciplines. First, feminist economists emphasize 
that individual wants and values are part of a gender 
ideology constructed by social relations. Gender 
roles, ideas of what is "masculine" and "feminine," 
may arguably have some biological basis, but they 
are primarily socially constructed. For example, in 
the Walt Disney movie The Lion King, female lions 
are drawn without whiskers, while in The Jungle 
Book, elephants live in a mostly male and male-led 
herd. The portrayal of gender here and more 
generally has more to do with cultural norms than 
biological reality. 
In theorizing how social relations shape 
gender and, in turn, preferences, feminist 
economists draw from a wide range of sources, 
from radical political economy to post-structuralist 
theory. Underlying all of these, however, is the 
theme that if preferences are constructed through 
social relations and personal experiences, then they 
may be reconstructed as social relations change and 
people gain new experiences. The changeability of 
preferences, indeed almost their malleability, is 
crucial to the feminist project. If we accept the basic 
feminist premise that gender relations can and 
should be more equal, and furthermore if we accept 
that "preferences" are a major reason for unequal 
gender relations, it then follows that preference 
change is a prerequisite for the social change 
feminists fight for. 
Feminist models of preference change 
differ fundamentally from neoclassical models of 
endogenous preference in three respects. First, 
feminist economists look to a much broader range 
of influences, including language, culture, and 
politics, as well as economic variables such as 
prices and incomes. Second, feminist theorists see 
preference change as resulting, in part, from 
dissatisfaction or internal conflict with internalized 
social norms, and not as the rational choice of fully-
informed individuals. Third, feminist models of 
preference change are not deterministic. Individuals 
may participate, alone or through collective action, 
in transforming their wants and values. The account 
is not deterministic because agency is exercised not 
only in the choice of actions based on given wants, 
but also in the construction of the wants themselves. 
Finally, and most fundamentally, 
neoclassical models generally postulate the 
existence of a stable, underlying meta-preference 
order (Stiglerand Becker 1977). Feminists do not. 
Indeed, many feminists argue that there is no 
universal man or woman who can be understood 
apart from the set of social institutions which 
constitute them as subjects and agents, so 
discussion of individual preferences in a feminist 
context is meaningless. 
Feminists are correct in arguing that the 
economic view of choice, where choice simply 
involves maximization of utility subject to 
constraints, is deterministic. People's actions are 
predetermined by preferences, prices, and incomes. 
Yet social determinism, where all actions are 
socially constructed, seems to be little improvement 
over economic determinism. The challenge for 
feminists is to find a middle ground which 
acknowledges both the possibility of choice and the 
reality of socially constructed constraints. In this 
middle ground is the potential for a feminist 
economic account of agency. Part of the 
acknowledgment of female agency is recognizing 
that women have interests, wants and desires, and 
that women act on these. Throwing out the concept 
of choice entirely risks disempowering women. If 
women have interests, and act on their interests, 
there is a strong role for individual and collective 
agency in feminist economics. The formulation of 
a new account of female agency is a substantive 
contribution that feminist economics makes to 
feminist scholarship and to economics. Yet feminist 
models of choice and agency contrast sharply with 
neoclassical models of choice and agency in terms 
of what constitutes an agent's welfare, and what can 
be inferred from agent's choices. 
II. ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF 
PREFERENCE, ALTERNATIVE WELFARE 
ECONOMICS 
Neoclassical economists generally identify 
well-being with choice. A person's choice of 
oranges over apples reveals that oranges provide 
her with greater well-being, utility, or satisfaction 
than do apples. Preferences can be inferred from 
choices. Neoclassical economic thought takes the 
liberal position that we should respect people's 
preferences, regardless of their origin. Janet 
Radcliffe Richards provides a nice summary of the 
liberal perspective: 
even though the wishes and expectations 
men and women have of each other may 
be culturally induced and not an inevitable 
part of their natures, that is not the 
slightest reason for ignoring them. A 
liberator must allow people as they 
actually are to make their own choices, 
because their culturally determined 
preferences are still theirs. (Richards 1980, 
187) 
The strength of liberalism is its respect for 
individuals. 
The liberal argument does, however, have 
three weaknesses. First, people lack education, 
information, and opportunities for reflection, which 
can lead them to make choices which, in retrospect, 
are mistaken. Moreover, people may make choices 
that they regret, so their actions may be a poor 
guide to their preferences. This is particularly a 
problem for fundamental choices spanning long 
period of time; for example, should a Bengali 
household sell its ancestral land and seek wage 
work in the city? What is chosen is not necessarily 
what leads to greatest "well-being," and we cannot 
retrieve preferences from choices. 
Second, taking preferences as given may 
justify continuation of oppression. If institutions 
limit women's opportunities, women may attempt to 
avoid frustration and disappointment by adjusting to 
the way things are, seeking happiness by serving 
men and children, and not develop aspirations for 
themselves that cannot be fulfilled. Third, 
emphasizing choice tends to obscure systemic 
differences in the options available to men and 
women. Something may be a person's best choice 
and still be perfectly disgusting. In this section, I 
will outline two strategies for breaking the link 
between choice and well-being and forming 
alternative conceptions of welfare. The first 
involves creating a richer vocabulary for, and better 
psychology of, choices and preferences. The 
second involves interrogating people's preferences 
to arrive at "informed desires." 
Altruism and Responsibility 
Julie Nelson (1996) distinguishes between 
"altruism" and "responsibility" as motivations for 
unselfish behaviour. Altruism involves doing 
something for others because it makes the doer feel 
personally better off; responsibility is action based 
on a sense of what is right; for example: 
If you get up in the middle of the night to 
feed a baby because you feel sorry for it, 
you are acting "altruistically"; if you get 
up when you would feel personally better 
off just putting your pillow over your 
head, you are acting responsibly. Since 
after the hundredth or so such occasion 
one is likely to feel more sorry for oneself 
than for the child, it is a good thing for 
children that most parents treat 
childrearing as a commitment. (Nelson 
1996, 70-71) 
Nelson's discussion provides a language to express 
the internal conflict a person can feel between her 
desires and her responsibilities. 
In terms of neoclassical welfare 
economics, if a person gets up to feed the baby 
when she could have stayed in bed, this is clearly 
the course of action she prefers and the one that 
leads to the greatest well-being (given the 
constraints she faces). Most economic analyses 
make no distinction between alternative 
motivations for behaviour. Underlying modern 
economics is a simple psychology. People have a 
single, unified set of preferences. Fulfilment of 
preferences leads to greater well-being. There is no 
hesitancy, no struggle, no conflict between what a 
person wants and what she thinks is right. 
The economic view is appealing in its 
simplicity. Yet there are a number of reasons why 
distinguishing motivations for actions is useful. 
First, the distinction between altruism and 
responsibility provides a richer psychology that 
leads to a better understanding of the relationship 
between choice and well-being. As Sen (1982) has 
argued, people can be viewed as having multiple 
rankings of actions. For example, the 
"responsibility" ranking might put action F, feeding 
the baby, above action S, sleeping, while the 
"egoism" ranking might put S above F. At times, 
one ranking guides actions, at times another. 
Making a distinction between these motivations 
helps us understand the nature of choice and the 
relationship between choice and well-being. 
Second, the altruism-responsibility-egoism 
distinction can be used in making welfare 
judgments. Sen suggests that a person's moral views 
are encompassed in her ranking of the altruism, 
responsibility and egoism rankings, or "meta 
ranking" (Sen 1982). These meta-rankings can be 
used to judge the state of the world, possibly 
providing an alternative basis for welfare 
economics. 
Third, drawing a distinction between 
altruism, responsibility, and egoism may lead to 
greater understanding of women's position. If giving 
to and caring for others is viewed as altruism and 
not responsibility, total utility (the sum of individual 
utilities) is maximized if more altruistic people 
(people who care for others more than others care 
for them) have lower consumption. Overall utility is 
maximized if resources are transferred, either 
voluntarily or through government policy, from 
people who care for others to the others who are 
cared for - both an altruistic mother and a selfish 
child enjoy the child eating ice-cream, but the 
selfish child derives no satisfaction from the mother 
having ice-cream. If no distinction is drawn 
between altruism and responsibility, a person's 
concern for others legitimates her relative 
deprivation. For anyone with a modicum of concern 
with the position of women, this is unacceptable. 
Yet there are reasons to be careful in using 
the altruism-responsibility-egoism distinction. 
Moral philosophers have too often seen justice as 
applying to men in a position of mutual disinterest, 
while women and family relationships are excluded 
from philosophical analysis. When we distinguish 
altruism and responsibility as motivations for 
behaviour, are we taking the first steps towards a 
humanistic moral philosophy that brings personal 
connection into the moral sphere, or are we once 
again separating out the private (altruism and 
responsibility) and the public (egoism) spheres, the 
family and the market? 
Second, for feminists, it in some sense 
does not matter whether actions are motivated by 
altruism or responsibility. Both altruism and 
responsibility are the outcome of years of 
conditioning, and do not necessarily represent "true 
selves," "interests" or "informed desires." 
Moreover, the word "responsibility" conveys a 
sense of duty or obligation. Responsibilities are 
imposed by social conventions, as well as being 
freely chosen. For example, schools or care-givers 
often call the mother before the father when the 
child is unwell or has other problems, reinforcing 
the expectation that the mother is responsible for 
the child's well-being. 
The distinction between altruism, 
responsibility, and egoism is a relevant one. But it 
is not just a new wrinkle that can be attached to 
existing theories of welfare economics. Once one 
realizes that responsibility makes it difficult to 
equate choice with well-being, a difficulty 
compounded by the culturally determined and 
gendered nature of responsibility, one has to 
wonder whether choice and well-being provide a 
satisfactory basis for welfare economics. 
Interrogating Preferences 
A second refinement of the concept of 
preferences comes from the recognition that people 
lack information and self-awareness, and so make 
choices which appear mistaken. One road for 
feminist research is to recognize explicitly people's 
lack of information and self-awareness, and explore 
the consequences both of the lack of information 
and awareness and of projects to increase 
information and awareness. There is a long 
philosophical tradition of recognizing that people's 
"informed desires" may differ from desires 
conceived in ignorance. Annas (1993,282) defines 
"informed desires" as the preferences women 
would form "given full knowledge of all aspects of 
their situation." From a feminist perspective, 
"informed desires" require more than just 
information; they require self-awareness gained 
from, for example, introspection, reflection, and 
collective action, and they are not always easy to 
discover. 
The idea that information and self-
awareness leads women to change their wants, their 
informed desires, is an old one, but it is still a strong 
current in popular feminism. Betty Friedan 
observed the dissatisfaction of American 
housewives in the late 1950s and argued that it 
stemmed from trying to conform to an artificial 
"feminine mystique." She argued that women must 
change their goals and ambitions: "A massive 
attempt must be made by educators and parents ... 
insisting ... that girls develop the resources of self, 
goals that will permit them to find their own 
identity" (Friedan 1963,351). Gloria Steinem urges 
readers to "relearn their true selves" (1992, 153). 
Her thesis is that self-esteem is a "practical source 
of revolution" (1992, 330). 
Yet the idea of informed desires brings out 
basic tensions within feminism. It can be a 
justification for devaluing women's legitimate 
choices by saying, for example, a woman choosing 
to quit paid employment to look after her children 
is simply misinformed. Moreover, any idea of 
"informed desires" runs the risk of imposing 
culturally specific values on others, a form of 
cultural imperialism. Finally, if the self is socially 
constructed, what is the "true self? It is perhaps too 
easy to construct a Rational Economic Woman, the 
product of a Western ideal of gender relations, who 
can stand hand in hand with Rational Economic 
Man, both making utility maximizing choices on the 
basis of informed desires. 
However, a focus on informed desires need 
not lead to imposition of one person's values on 
another i f the focus is shifted away from the desires 
themselves. After all, as no one has ever been raised 
in an egalitarian society free from prescribed gender 
roles, no one can tell what our desires would be in 
such a society. A more productive focus is the 
methodological approaches and processes that arise 
from attempts to interrogate preferences. One way 
of bringing the idea of informed desires into welfare 
economic analysis is through the notion of 
"empowerment." In gender and development, 
empowerment is frequently taken as an objective 
for social policy in its own right, much as 
neoclassical economists view efficiency. 
Empowerment is the development of women's 
capacity for self-reliance and internal strength. The 
idea behind empowerment is that through 
mobilization around practical gender needs, such as 
housing or family planning, women become aware 
of their strategic interests, for example in land 
rights, and gain strength to articulate - both to 
themselves and to others - these interests and to 
lobby actively for recognition of their interests. 
The empowerment approach differs in 
many ways from conventional measures of, say, 
economic well-being. First, it focuses on the 
process of changing gender relations as much as 
outcomes. Second, it is activist. For example, 
Moser (1991) gives the G A B R I E L A alliance in the 
Philippines as an example of a successful exercise 
in empowerment. The alliance ran a project which 
combined women's traditional task of sewing 
tapestry - meeting practical gender needs - with 
discussion of women's legal rights and the 
constitution - raising awareness of women's 
strategic interests. 
The points to make here are that 
empowerment, as articulated in the gender and 
development literature, is a useful concept because 
it identifies a process through which women gain 
strength to fight for greater equality. One 
contribution of this paper is to show that the idea of 
empowerment directly addresses some of the 
reasons that the identification of choice and well-
being is problematic. As argued above, because of 
the socially constructed nature of preference and an 
agent's lack of knowledge, we cannot identify 
choice with well-being. However empowerment 
enables women to make choices that are closer to 
their "informed desires," it enhances women's 
capacity to exercise agency. Finally, the 
empowerment idea suggests a change in focus for 
project evaluation from outcomes to processes; for 
example, a project's effects on community 
structures, opportunities for people to come 
together, communicate, and organize. Yet the idea 
of empowerment and the shift towards evaluation 
of processes and structures prefigures a movement 
away from concerns about the nature of preference 
and choice towards a greater focus on the 
constraints on women's agency. 
III. BREAKING AWAY FROM 
PREFERENCE AND WELFARE 
Empowerment suggests a shift of focus for 
feminist economics away from the nature of 
preference and towards the alternatives available to 
women. In this section, I consider two approaches: 
what I call the "gender ideology as constraint" 
approach and the "capabilities" approach. 
Ideology as Constraint 
Bina Agarwal (1994, 57) argues, "what 
may be needed is less a sharpening of women's 
sense of self-interest than an improvement in their 
ability to pursue that interest." Although we may 
not be able to describe every woman's interests with 
perfect accuracy, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that she has an interest in the most basic of 
fundamental human rights: being adequately 
nourished and healthy, achieving a functional level 
of literacy, and living a life free from violence. This 
approach - ascribing to all people certain basic 
interests, and proceeding from there - represents a 
fundamental shift from the approach in Section II. 
Both approaches recognize the crucial importance 
of gender ideology. But whereas in Section II, 
internalized gender ideologies were taken as part of 
people's preferences, necessitating new theoretical 
structures and new methodologies, the approach 
described here views gender ideology as a 
constraint on women's behaviour, one that women 
oppose through covert resistance. This approach is 
fruitful for analysis, but has major methodological 
implications, as I discuss below. 
There are reasons feminists may be 
uncomfortable with the gender as ideology 
approach, especially in the strong form articulated 
by Bina Agarwal. First, the idea that all individuals 
share basic interests is reminiscent of the 
neoclassical methodology of Stigler and Becker 
(1977). However, feminist economics such as Bina 
Agarwal do recognize ideology, but as a constraint 
on behaviour embodied in institutions, not as the 
primary determinant of preferences. Second, 
assuming any set of interests risks universalizing, 
imposing a particular set of cultural values. 
However, the approach does have the compelling 
advantage that it focuses directly upon the factors 
which constrain the advancement of women's 
interests, for example, the gender ideologies 
embodied in institutional structures and how these 
institutional structures shape women's lives. 
An example of what I mean by the 
"ideology as constraint" approach is Bina Agarwal's 
(1994) analysis of the gender distribution of 
property rights and how lack of access to property 
rights constrains women. Agarwal's work is 
feminist, but it is feminist primarily because of the 
questions she poses. What obstacles prevent women 
from holding property rights? What happens if 
women have property rights? Agarwal uses a wide 
range of approaches, from traditional economic 
ones such as impacts on economic efficiency to the 
empowerment approach advocated by many 
feminists, to answer these questions and to argue 
for the reformation of, for example, inheritance 
laws. 
Diane Elson and Rosemary McGee (1995, 
1991) also argue that "economic institutions and 
processes must be perceived as permeated by 
gender," yet they look to a broader range of 
structures. For example, they view women's 
traditional responsibility for unpaid work in the 
home ("social reproduction and family 
maintenance") as a constraint on women's 
behaviour. They too argue that economic efficiency 
can be part of the policy appraisal process, with the 
caveat that non-market costs of policies, for 
example time spent in household work, be included 
in any examination of efficiency in resource use. 
Can New Questions be Answered with an Old 
Methodology? 
Both Agarwal (1994) and Elson and 
McGee (1995) maintain that elimination of 
structural, gendered inequalities can be defended on 
grounds of economic efficiency. A major advantage 
of using measures such as economic efficiency is 
that they facilitate communication with 
neoclassically trained economic decision-makers. 
Yet their work shows the difficulties inherent in 
answering new questions with an old methodology. 
To take one example, a key efficiency argument for 
granting women greater land rights is that it 
increases women's bargaining power within the 
household, and, because empirical evidence shows 
women tend to spend more of their income on 
children than do men, greater bargaining power for 
women is associated with improved health of 
children, which leads to long run efficiency gains. 
However, bargaining power within a household is 
not amenable to measurement with standard 
economic tools. 
Reading recent work by feminist 
economists, it appears that as economists begin to 
ask feminist questions, a methodological shift such 
as that described by Sandra Harding (1987) is 
taking place. Harding argues that it is attention to 
women's experience, particularly women's 
experiences in political struggles, which is the new 
and defining characteristic of feminist research. 
Moreover, women themselves can best reveal their 
interests. The job of a researcher is to listen 
carefully to informants, to observe behaviours 
previously thought unimportant and, above all, to 
enter into the same critical plane as the subject 
matter. Everyone comes to research with beliefs that 
shape her or his research; only by being open about 
these beliefs can credible research findings be 
obtained. 
The potential for drawing misleading 
conclusions when qualitative information is 
eschewed in favour of the quantitative can be seen 
in, for example, many international studies of the 
evaluation of unpaid household work. Measures of 
unpaid work are needed for comparing economic 
welfare between and within countries and also over 
time, as production shifts between the household 
and the market. However, most measures of 
household work underestimate time spent in 
childcare since secondary childcare activities, that 
is, minding the children while cooking dinner, are 
not included. Moreover, conventional methods do 
not capture the context and the meaning attached to 
household tasks. More qualitative research 
methods, such as participant observation or 
unstructured interviews, and more extensive 
reporting of qualitative findings, would give greater 
understanding of the complexity of unpaid work 
and what's behind superficially plausible estimates 
of the value of household work. 
Yet there are reasons to be cautious about 
valuing qualitative research studies per se. First, 
feminist studies of the qualitative, participant 
observation-based Participatory Rural Appraisal 
(PRA) method of evaluating projects used 
increasingly by NGOs and even the World Bank 
have concluded that these methods do not 
necessarily advance gender interests: 
PRA, far from providing a neutral vehicle 
for local knowledge, actually creates a 
context in which the selective presentation 
of opinion is likely to be exaggerated, and 
where minority or deviant views are likely 
to be suppressed...[it] can offer an avenue 
for the generalization of personal, and 
gender specific, interests. (Jackson 1996, 
500) 
The responsibility of women for child 
care, social restrictions on women's movement such 
as purdah, and the tendency for women to be less 
forthcoming in social situations may make it 
difficult for women to make their voices heard in 
participatory research projects. Moreover, if a 
researcher simply adopts qualitative methodologies 
without entering into the same critical plane as 
those observed - or enters but identifies with a 
particular sub-group in the community - the result 
may be even more distorted research. Yet avoiding 
this difficulty by relying on the "objectivity" of the 
researcher leads to just the scientism that Harding 
and other feminist methodologists decry. 
A second reason to be cautious about 
qualitative research is that even good qualitative 
research may lead to poor decision-making. 
Encouraging decision-makers to act on qualitative 
information and subjective experience may provide 
ajustification forrejection of policies favourable to 
women on the grounds of decision-maker's 
subjective - and perhaps atypical - experience, or on 
the reported experiences of a small minority 
opposed to a project. Making good decisions on the 
basis of qualitative information is in many ways 
more difficult than simply picking the highest 
project with the highest net benefit. 
Despite these concerns, there is still a 
strong case to be made for including information on 
people's experiences in project evaluations. 
Qualitative information comes into its own as a 
check against drawing incorrect conclusions based 
on numbers which may be extremely problematic 
and in balancing conventional information sources. 
Unfortunately, because the ideology of the status 
quo is persuasive, because using established 
conventions is often easier than changing, because 
gender considerations are not in the economic 
mainstream, and because standard cost-benefit 
techniques produce concrete numerical results, most 
project evaluations use neoclassical methods rather 
than the type of methodology Harding advocates. 
Functionings and Capabilities 
A second alternative to neoclassical 
methods, which is perhaps more amenable to 
production of numerical results and less obviously 
focused on gender considerations, is Sen's idea of 
"functionings" and "capabilities." Amartya Sen 
differs fundamentally from Bina Agarwal in arguing 
that certain women have little sense of their own 
interests: 
...if a typical Indian rural woman was 
asked about her personal "welfare," she 
would find the question unintelligible, and 
if she was able to reply, she might answer 
the question in terms of her reading of the 
welfare of her family. The idea of personal 
welfare may not be viable in such a 
context. (Sen 1990, 126) 
Problems with the concept of personal welfare, as 
well as concerns about identification of choice and 
well-being, have led Sen to develop an alternative 
to utilitarian measures of welfare: "functionings" 
and "capabilities." 
A person's "functionings" are the various 
things that a person manages to do or be, from 
being adequately nourished to achieving self-
respect. "Capabilities" are a measure of a person's 
ability to exercise her own agency: her freedom to 
lead different types of life (Sen 1993, 33). A 
person's capabilities depend in part upon the range 
of functionings she has to choose from, and in part 
on the social relations that constrain or promote her 
freedom of choice. The key theoretical contribution 
made by the idea of capabilities and functionings is 
the derivation of a non-utility based measure of 
well-being. That is, a malnourished person has a 
lower level of functioning than a well-nourished 
person, regardless of which person is "happier." 
The approach breaks the link between choice and 
well-being. A neoclassical economist, seeing a 
mother depriving herself so other family members 
do not go hungry, could rationalize the situation by 
saying that she is maximizing her utility. If we 
instead value outcomes in terms of people 
achieving the functioning of being adequately 
nourished and healthy, then self-sacrifice which 
leads to malnourished mothers becomes a social 
problem, not an optimal outcome of rational choice. 
Sen's writing on capabilities and 
functionings has been influential in inspiring new 
approaches to the evaluation of economic policy, 
particularly social indicator approaches. The best 
known of these is the United Nations' Human 
Development Index (HDI). The HD1 incorporates 
functionings in a basic way, evaluating countries' 
performances on three key measures of 
functioning: life expectancy, educational attainment 
and income. 
Sen's original research was not motivated 
primarily by feminist concerns, and the original 
HDI did not have a gender component. However 
since 1995, in part because of the concerted efforts 
of many feminists at the United Nations, the U N 
has been publishing separate GDI (gender-related 
development index) figures for men and for 
women, and also a ranking of countries' HDI 
indices adjusted for gender inequities. The GDI is 
based on the same indicators as the HDI: life 
expectancy, educational attainment and adjusted 
per capita income (UN 1995, 127). Separate male 
and female indices are calculated for life 
expectancy, educational attainment and income. 
Inequality in the male and female values for these 
indices is calculated, and then averaged to give the 
GDI. 
However, in many countries literacy and 
schooling rates tend to be similar for men and 
women, and life expectancy rates do not differ 
substantially, so the main determinant of the GDI is 
a measure of the female earnings, which is itself 
based upon average earnings of women compared 
to men and the labour force participation rate. This 
is a problematic indicator of women's status for two 
reasons. First, increased labour force participation 
may be associated with a double work burden if it is 
not accompanied by a redistribution of unpaid 
work. Second, earnings are an imperfect indicator 
of the resources available to girls or women within 
a household, as sharing in other household 
members' income and household production are 
excluded. 
Despite the limitations of the GDI, it has 
made a major contribution in publicizing gender 
inequality and addresses many of the limitations of 
GDP as a measure of the well-being of people in a 
country. For example, while per capita GDP 
numbers are independent of the distribution of 
income, measures such as life expectancy and 
literacy are much more sensitive to how income is 
distributed between rich and poor. This, combined 
with the fact that many feminists are deeply 
concerned with capabilities such as women's ability 
to live a life free from fear and hunger, has led to a 
growing feminist literature on applying the 
capabilities approach in feminist analysis (see, for 
example, Gale Summerfield's 1994 evaluation of 
Chinese economic reforms or Valentine 
Moghadam's 1994 analysis of female access to 
education in Afghanistan). However feminist 
attempts to use capabilities, as well as the UN GDI, 
encounter a number of difficulties which are 
inherent in the capabilities approach. 
First, measures such as life expectancy 
focus only on what a person achieves, not what a 
person is able to choose to achieve. For example, 
women live longer than men on average in 
industrialized countries. Does this in part reflect 
social conventions, now or in the past, that frown 
on women smoking, or eating unfeminine 
quantities of red meat? Perhaps it reflects women's 
lower earnings and our resulting inability to buy 
fast cars in which to have fatal accidents? It is good 
to be able to live a long and healthy life, but it may 
be as good to be able to choose what type of life to 
lead. 
Second, policy choices frequently involve 
trade-offs between different functionings and 
capabilities. For example, is it better to fund an 
irrigation project which increases nutrition 
functionings or an education project which 
improves others? A valuation of the two projects 
will involve some comparison of the two 
functionings. Indeed, the U N HDI implicitly 
contains trade-offs between functionings. As Paul 
Clements (1995, 580) has pointed out, a country 
with a per capita GDP below $4,688 could achieve 
a 1% gain in its 1992 HDI score by increasing its 
per capita GDP by $141, by increasing its literacy 
rate by 4.5%, or by increasing its average life 
expectancy by 1.1 years. It is not obvious that these 
three changes are equal in terms of social progress, 
nor is it obvious which one represents the greatest 
social gain. 
Many would find the trade-off between 
income and life expectancy implicit in the HDI 
unacceptable. An alternative is simply to describe 
the effect of policies on various functionings, while 
accepting that functionings are at some level 
incomparable and that the functionings approach 
gives an incomplete and partial ordering of states of 
the world. Indeed, a useful project for feminist 
economists would be the development of indicators 
of women's functionings and capabilities such as 
reproductive freedom, capacity to participate in 
civil society, or freedom from abuse. Such 
indicators would not necessarily highlight a single 
best policy choice, but they would show the effect 
of alternative policies on women, and clarify the 
trade-offs to be made. The functionings/capacities 
approach does have limitations but, like the gender 
ideology as constraint approach, it suggests new 
directions for feminist research. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has discussed four feminist 
directions for change in welfare economics, the 
evaluation of the normative significance of 
economic events. Two come out of alternative 
conceptions of preference: first, the idea of 
rewriting the theoretical basis of welfare economics 
to bring in a more complex psychology 
distinguishing altruism and responsibility as 
motivations for behaviour; and second, the idea of 
interrogating preferences, and shifting the focus of 
project evaluation from outcomes to the process of 
empowerment. Two other directions break away 
from concerns about the nature of preference and 
preference endogeneity: first, taking gender 
ideology as a constraint on people's behaviour; and 
second, evaluating policies in terms of people's 
functionings and capabilities. 
Of these four approaches, which should be 
the priority for feminist economic research? One 
way of answering this question is to return to Chris 
Weedon's observation that feminism is a politics 
(Weedon 1987). It is a movement aiming to achieve 
greater equity between men and women. One way 
of choosing between approaches to policy 
evaluation is to take that which seems likely to have 
the greatest impact on policy makers. On these 
grounds, it appears that perhaps the strongest case 
can be made focusing directly on structures which 
constrain women and arguing for the removal of 
such constraints on a variety of bases, including 
standard economic criteria such as efficiency gains. 
However, this approach does run into the 
difficulty that many economic tools are ill-adapted 
to measuring what happens outside of markets, 
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